

Ex Ante Fairness And Preference Submission Timing 20150227

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Ex Ante Fairness And Preference

In particular, we are able to achieve ex-ante group fairness [19], which generalizes both envy-freeness and Pareto optimality, in conjunction with two ex-post fairness properties that are incomparable but are both implied by EF1: proportionality up to one good [18] and envy-freeness up to one good more-and-less [6].

Best of Both Worlds: Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Fairness in ...

allocation that is ex ante fair, but instruct us to reallocate their tickets evenly if it turns out that the winning ticket is one of theirs. These results support our main conclusion: the most com-mon attitude toward fairness involves a time-consistent preference for applying naive deontological

When Fair Isn't Fair: Understanding Choice Reversals ...

Abstract In settings with uncertainty, tension exists between ex ante and ex post notions of fairness. Subjects in an experiment most commonly select the ex ante fair alternative ex ante and switch to the ex post fair alternative ex post. One potential explanation embraces consequentialism and construes reversals as time inconsistent.

When Fair Isn't Fair: Understanding Choice Reversals ...

second as exhibiting a preference for ex ante fairness only. By combining the two, we may easily get preferences for both ex post and ex ante fairness, though if Axiom 6 is satisfied Axiom 5 must be violated. Consider, for example, defining $U_{my}(.)$ to be the Fehr and Schmidt functional

Fairness, Risk Preferences and Independence: Impossibility ...

Here, stochastic ex-ante fairness refers to the concept of students with higher abilities having higher probabilities of being matched with better schools. A policy recommendation is that a reform from pre-BOS to post-SD is reasonable given a sufficiently "precise" scoring system, yet keeping the "old" system can also be justifiable.⁵

Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship ...

Highlights There are two obvious methods of extending social preferences from deterministic outcomes to lotteries. Using expected utility, the preferences do not exhibit ex ante fairness. Replacing certain outcomes with their expected utilities for each individual violates ex post fairness. Both ex ante and ex post fairness can be satisfied but then the individual does not have well defined ...

Fairness, risk preferences and independence: Impossibility ...

Fairness Ex Ante and Ex Post: Experimentally Testing Ex Post Judicial Intervention into Blockbuster Deals. Christoph Engel. Corresponding Author. Max-Planck-Institute for Research on Collective Goods. Christoph Engel, Max-Planck-Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher-Straße 10, 53113 Bonn, Germany; email;

Fairness Ex Ante and Ex Post: Experimentally Testing Ex ...

preferences and ex post fairness. D captures the ex ante fairness penalty by being sensitive only to differences in marginal risks. Although this model might look too general -it is after all defined over distributions- and therefore capable of or-ganizing data better just by being more flexible, I show that, provided with the

Risk Attitudes and Fairness: Theory and Experiment

As indicated in the second column of the table, 98.1% of the subjects accept the advantageous allocation in the ex-ante condition (N = 52), while 46.2% accept the disadvantageous allocation, rejecting outcome fairness from the ex-ante perspective. In the ex-post condition, subjects made only one decision, depending on the allocation that was selected.

Process fairness, outcome fairness, and dynamic ...

other mechanisms (pre-/post-SD and post-BOS) can always implement stochastic ex-ante fairness (students with higher ability having higher probability of admission to better schools), while pre-BOS may not. Keywords: Preference Submission Timing, Boston, Serial Dictatorship, Ex-ante Fairness, Constrained School Choice

Ex-ante Fairness in the Boston and Serial Dictatorship ...

However, we show that economic efficiency and ex-ante envy-freeness can be simultaneously achieved if we slightly relax our ex-post fairness guarantee. On our way, we characterize the well-known Maximum Nash Welfare allocation rule in terms of a recently introduced fairness guarantee that applies to groups of agents, not just individuals.

Best of Both Worlds: Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Fairness in ...

In this paper we consider a potential way of improving ex-ante fairness - a Boston mechanism with the requirement that students submit their preferences before the exam score is realized (the "...

(PDF) Ex-ante Fairness in the Boston and Serial ...

one prefers one or the other depends on what one cares about, ex-ante efficiency or ex- post fairness (point 1). We hypothesize that whether one cares about one or the other depends on how payoffs are presented (point 2).

Social preferences under risk: Ex-post Fairness vs. efficiency

Ex-ante fairness in the boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission. Working paper, 2015. Pais, J., & Pinter, A. (2008). School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms.

Preference submission timing in school choice matching ...

improving ex-ante fairness. Second, preference submission timing in the school choice matching problem is a new dimension of the student-to-

school matching mechanism design which has not been fully explored in literature. Although various tie-breaking rules for school priorities and private information about student

Ex-ante Fairness in the Boston and Serial Dictatorship ...

I confirm ex ante fairness behavior is a comm! on choice pattern and document how, according to the model, it responds to its relative price. Finally, I reject the implication of existing models that stronger ex ante fairness behavior correlates with less risk sensitivity.

Risk Attitudes and Fairness: Theory and Experiment | Jack ...

If we do so by expected utility theory, so that the independence axiom is satisfied, our results imply that the resulting preferences do not exhibit ex ante fairness. If we do so by replacing certain outcomes with their expected utilities for each individual, so that individual risk preferences are preserved, then ex ante fairness may be preserved, but neither the independence axiom nor ex post fairness is satisfied.

CiteSeerX — Fairness, Risk Preferences and Independence ...

Ex-Ante Fairness in the Boston and Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms Under Pre-Exam and Post-Exam Preference Submission Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 101, p. 98-120, January 2017 Number of pages: 43 Posted: 15 Jan 2016 Last Revised: 07 May 2017

Author Page for Xiaohan Zhong :: SSRN

To our knowledge, it is the first multi-jurisdictional field study of litigants' ex ante procedural preferences. It examines preferences within a "laboratory-like" environment that holds constant as much as possible the court-connected options that litigants could consider.

The Psychology of Procedural Preference: How Litigants ...

Best of Both Worlds: Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Fairness in Resource Allocation. Rupert Freeman, Nisarg Shah, and Rohit Vaish. To appear in Proceedings of the Twenty-First ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC-20). Full version. Proportionality in Approval-Based Elections With a Variable Number of Winners.

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